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Introduction	  During	   the	  past	  30	  years	  biotechnology	  has	  been	  used	   to	  develop	  a	   range	  of	  useful	   types	  of	  animal.	  These	  animals	  have	  made	  huge	  contributions	  to	  basic	  research	  and	  biomedicine	  and	  are	  beginning	  to	  enter	  the	  agricultural	  production	  system.	  This	  development	  raises	  a	  number	  of	  ethical	  questions.	  The	  central	  issue,	  as	  is	  so	  often	  the	  case,	  is	  about	  the	  boundaries	  of	  ethical	  acceptability.	  Most	  people	  would	  readily	  agree	  that	  there	  is	  a	  difference	  between	  what	  humans	  can	  do	  and	  what	  they	  
ought	  to	  do.	  Equally,	  most	  people	  would	  happily	  acknowledge	   that	   it	   is	  good	  to	  do	   the	  morally	  right	  thing.	  However,	  the	  harmony	  usually	  ends	  there,	  because	  although	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  agree	  that	  a	  good	  thing	  should	   be	   promoted,	   it	   is	   often	   hard	   to	   reach	   consensus	   on	  what	   that	   good	   thing	   is,	   how	   it	   can	   be	  promoted,	  and	  where	  to	  draw	  the	  line	  between	  what	  is	  acceptable	  and	  what	  is	  not.	  As	  soon	  as	  we	  begin	  discussing	   these	   questions,	  whether	   in	   private	   or	   in	   public,	  we	   are	   engaging	   in	   ethical	   discussion	   –	  discussion	  in	  which	  we	  seek	  to	  establish	  a	  substantial	  understanding	  of	  the	  concepts	  of	  good	  and	  right	  that	   can	   guide	   our	   choices	   when	   we	   are	   faced	   with	   opportunities	   whose	   acceptability	   appears	  uncertain.	  The	   issue	  of	  ethical	  acceptability	  has	  closely	  shadowed	  developments	  within	  biotechnology	  over	   the	  past	   30	   years,	   not	   least	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   animal	   biotechnology.	   A	   range	   of	   possibilities	   including	  reproductive	   technologies,	  genetic	  modification	  and	  cloning	  has	  prompted	  concern	  about	   the	  ethical	  limits	  of	  our	  use	  of	  animals.	  It	  is	  probably	  an	  understatement	  to	  say	  that	  discussion	  has	  so	  far	  led	  to	  no	  consensus	  in	  the	  public	  sphere,	  but	  it	  would	  also	  be	  an	  overstatement	  to	  say	  that	  the	  debate	  has	  been	  futile.	   What	   has	   emerged,	   among	   other	   things,	   is	   a	   clearer	   understanding	   of	   the	   basic	   ethical	  assumptions	  behind	  the	  different	  viewpoints,	   together	  with	  greater	  attention	  to	  our	  ethical	  duties	  to	  animals.	  	  
What	  is	  animal	  biotechnology?	  Animal	  biotechnology	  has	  developed	  rapidly	  over	  the	  past	  20-­‐25	  years.	  The	  production	  of	  genetically	  modified	   animals	   began	   in	   the	   early	   1980s,	   and	   cloning	   took	   off	   with	   the	   experiments	   by	   Steen	  Willadsen	   in	   the	   mid-­‐1980s	   in	   which	   cloned	   sheep	   were	   produced	   by	   embryonic	   cell	   transfer	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  (Willadsen,	  1986).	  However,	  cloning	  technology	  only	  came	  to	  public	  prominence	  through	  work,	   lead	  by	  Ian	  Wilmut,	  in	  which	  somatic	  cell	  nuclear	  transfer	  was	  used	  to	  produce	  the	  cloned	  sheep,	  Dolly,	  in	  1996	  (Wilmut	  et	  al.,	  1997).	  Most	  work	  within	  animal	  biotechnology	  has	  been	  carried	  out	  on	  laboratory	  mice,	  sheep	  and	  cattle,	  but	  more	  recently	  the	  technologies	  have	  been	  adapted	  to	  other	  species	  such	  as	  pigs,	  goats,	  horses	  and	  cats.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  methodologies	  and	  success	  rates	  vary	  from	  species	  to	  species.	  	  Animal	  biotechnology	  is	  used	  primarily	  for	  two	  purposes:	  to	  produce	  animals	  that	  can	  be	  employed	  in	  basic	  biological	  research	  into	  biological	  development	  and	  function,	  and	  to	  produce	  disease	  models	  that	  mimic	  human	  diseases	  and	  can	  therefore	  be	  utilised	  both	  in	  the	  study	  of	  disease	  (such	  as	  Parkinson’s,	  cancer,	  cystic	  fibrosis,	  etc.)	  and	  to	  test	  new	  drugs.	  Increasingly,	  since	  the	  early	  1990s,	  researchers	  have	  sought	   to	  develop	  animals	  with	   special	   traits	  making	   them	  useful	  within	  pharmaceutical	  production	  (bioreactors)	  and	  to	  create	  production	  animals	  with	  traits	  offering	  improved	  production,	  better	  animal	  health	  and/or	  reduced	  environmental	  impact.	  None	  of	  these	  applications	  has	  reached	  the	  market	  yet,	  but	  reports	  indicate	  that	  the	  first	  pharmaceuticals	  based	  on	  human	  proteins	  produced	  in	  animals	  are	  to	  be	  released	   in	  2006	  (CeBRA,	  2005a).	  Similarly,	   some	  observers	  expect	   the	   first	  cloned	  animals	   to	  reach	   the	   agricultural	   production	   system	   in	   a	   few	   years;	   others	   anticipate	   that	   genetically	  modified	  animals	  will	  also	  enter	  the	  system	  within	  the	  foreseeable	  future	  (NAS,	  2002).	  Animal	   biotechnology	   can	   be	   defined	   in	   a	   number	   of	   ways.	   Which	   definition	   is	   used	   is	   of	   some	  importance,	  because	  the	  definition	  determines	  what	  should	  be	  considered	  a	  biotechnological	  novelty	  and	  what	  should	  be	  considered	  an	  established	  practice.	  Thus	  some	  people	  believe	  that	  only	  the	  new	  possibilities	   with	   genetic	   engineering	   and	   cloning	   should	   be	   categorised	   as	   animal	   biotechnology,	  while	  others	  wish	  to	  include	  well-­‐established	  breeding	  technologies	  such	  as	  artificial	  insemination	  and	  even	  some	  older	  breeding	  practices	  (AICE,	  1996;	  NAS,	  2002).	  From	  an	  argumentative	  viewpoint,	  there	  are	   various	   reasons	   for	   including	   as	   much,	   or	   as	   little,	   as	   possible	   under	   the	   heading	   animal	  
biotechnology,	   but	  we	   shall	   not	   discuss	   the	  merits	   of	   the	   contrasting	   definitions	   here.	   The	  more	   the	  new	  technologies	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  natural	  extension	  of	  well-­‐established	  practices	  the	  more	   it	  can	  be	  argued	   that	   there	   is	   nothing	   new	   under	   the	   sun	   and	   that,	   for	   example,	   regulation	   can	   be	   based	   on	  existing	   regulation	   and	   that	   the	   ethical	   concerns	   are	   no	   different	   from	   those	   arising	   from	   already	  established	  technologies	  –	  and	  vice	  versa	  (Lane	  1996).	   In	   this	  article	  we	  will	  arrive	  at	  a	   fairly	  broad	  view,	  but	  our	  starting	  point	  will	  be	  modern	  biotechnological	  applications	  such	  as	  genetic	  engineering	  and	  cloning.	  We	  are	  proceeding	  in	  this	  way	  in	  order	  to	  demonstrate	  how	  the	  ethical	  debate	  about	  these	  novel	  possibilities	  might	  shed	  light	  on	  established	  practices	  within	  animal	  breeding.	  These	  established	  practices	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  the	  rediscovery	  of	  Mendelian	  theories	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  and	  the	  development	  of	  modern	  selective	  breeding	  practices	  from	  the	  1920s	  onwards.	  The	   possible	   applications	   of	   the	   new	   technologies	   can	   be	   divided	   up	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   reason	   for	  using	   the	   technology.	  The	   applications	   that	   are	  mentioned	   in	   this	   and	   the	   following	   section	   are	   the	  ones	  usually	  mentioned	   in	   scientific	   articles	   on	   animal	  biotechnology.	  This	  does	  not	  mean	   that	   they	  have	   come	   to	   fruition,	   but	   only	   that	   researchers	   believe	   that	   they	  will	   be	   achievable	   in	   the	   light	   of	  anticipated	  scientific	  and	   technological	  expertise	   (CeBRA	  2005).	  Thus	  some	  animals	  are	  used	  within	  basic	   research	   and	   as	   disease	   models	   (research	   animals).	   Here	   genetically	   modified	   animals	   are	  produced	   to	   investigate	   the	   function	   of	   genes	   and	   gene	   products	   and	   to	   create	   animals	   that	  mimic	  human	   diseases	   such	   as	   cancer	   or	   Parkinson’s	   disease.	   The	   aim	   is	   to	   facilitate	   research	   into	   the	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  diseases	  and	  test	  possible	  treatments	  (Khanna	  and	  Hunter,	  2005;	  Emborg,	  2004;	  Swanson	  et	  al.,	  2004).	  In	  this	  area,	  cloning	  is	  mainly	  used	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  produce	  the	  GM	  animals	  and	  to	  study	  abnormalities	  in	  reproduction	   (Olsson	   and	   Sandøe,	   2005).	   Other	   animals	   are	   used	   as	   bioreactors	   that	   produce	  biological	  compounds	  not	  naturally	  occurring	  in	  them	  (so-­‐called	  “pharm	  animals”).	  Typically	  a	  gene	  of	  human	  origin	  is	  introduced	  in	  the	  animal	  genome.	  This	  might	  be	  done	  to	  cause	  the	  animal	  to	  produce	  a	  specific	  protein	  in	  its	  milk	  that	  can	  be	  used	  in	  producing	  medicine	  to	  cure	  or	  alleviate	  human	  disease.	  For	   example,	   a	   sheep	   produced	   by	   the	   company	  PPL	  Therapeutics	   has	   been	   genetically	  modified	   to	  express	  a	  human	  protein	  in	  its	  milk	  called	  alpha-­‐1-­‐antitrypsin.	  Alpha-­‐1-­‐antitrypsin	  can	  be	  used	  in	  the	  treatment	  of	  lung	  disorders	  (NAS,	  2002).	  	  A	   third	   application	   involves	   animals	  used	  within	   the	   agricultural	   sector	   (farm	  animals).	   In	  principle	  animals	  with	  desirable	  traits	  could	  be	  cloned	  to	  speed	  up	  the	  dissemination	  of	  the	  desired	  genotypes;	  and	   animals	   could	   perhaps	   be	   genetically	  modified	   to	   increase	   productivity	   (growth	   rates,	   feedstuff	  utilisation,	  disease	  resistance,	  etc.),	  to	  develop	  new	  products	  (leaner	  meat,	  functional	  foods,	  etc.)	  or	  to	  reduce	   negative	   impact	   on	   the	   environment	   (Kues	   and	  Niemann,	   2004).	   Finally,	   there	   is	   a	   range	   of	  more	  or	  less	  “exotic”	  applications	  of	  biotechnologies.	  The	  first	  genetically	  modified	  pet	  hit	  the	  market	  in	   2003.	   It	   is	   a	   luminescent	   fish	   for	   aquariums	   called	   GloFish™	   (Caplan,	   2004,	   see	   also	  www.glofish.com).	   An	   American	   company	   –	   Genetic	   Savings	   and	   Clone,	   Inc.	   –	   offers	   to	   save	   genetic	  material	   from	  pets	   and	   clone	   them	   later.	   The	   company	   has	   so	   far	   only	   produced	   cloned	   cats,	   but	   it	  hopes	  to	  begin	  cloning	  dogs	  soon	  (CGS,	  2005).	  There	   is	  also	  speculation	  that	  cloning	  may	  be	  used	  to	  save	  endangered	  species	  or	  recreate	  extinct	  species	  (Holt	  et	  al.,	  2004).	  Serious	  attempts	  to	  clone	  Bos	  
gaurus,	  an	  endangered	  large	  wild	  ox,	  have	  been	  made	  but	  so	  far	  no	  successful	  results,	   in	  the	  form	  of	  viable	  animals,	  have	  been	  reported	  (Lanza	  et	  al.,	  2000).	  Other,	  more	   fanciful,	  projects	   in	  cloning,	   for	  example,	  Tasmanian	  tigers	  and	  mammoths	  are	  frequently	  reported	  in	  the	  media	  but	  no	  results	  of	  this	  kind	  have	  as	  yet	  been	  confirmed.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  a	  prerequisite	  of	  ethical	  thinking	  on	  a	  specific	  human	  practice,	  such	  as	  animal	  biotechnology,	  is	  sound	  understanding	  of	  the	  technologies	  involved,	  the	  science	  behind	  them	  and	  the	  objectives	   of	   the	   applications.	   Although	   it	   has	   been	   questioned	   to	   what	   extent	   this	   kind	   of	   factual	  information	   is	   necessary	   to	   be	   able	   to	   pass	   ethical	   judgment,	   there	   is	   no	   doubt	   that	   more	   than	  superficial	   understanding	   is	   needed	   (Thompson,	   1997).	   This,	   however,	   should	   not	   point	   to	   the	  erroneous	   conclusion	   that	  all	   that	   is	  needed	   to	   convert	   sceptics	   about	  biotechnology	   is	   information.	  Although	  widely	  assumed	  within	  the	  scientific	  community	  (CeBRA,	  2005d),	  the	  so-­‐called	  “knowledge	  deficit”	  of	   lay	  people	  does	  not	  explain	  the	  discrepancy	  between	  the	  often	  very	  positive	  conception	  of	  biotechnology	   that	   scientists	   bring	   to	   the	   debate	   and	   the	   far	   more	   sceptical	   attitude	   of	   the	   public.	  Studies	  have	  shown	  that	  the	  more	  information	  people	  have,	  the	  more	  likely	  they	  are	  to	  make	  up	  their	  minds	  and	  form	  an	  opinion;	  but	  they	  have	  also	  shown	  that	  this	  opinion	  will	  not	  necessarily	  be	  positive.	  Thus	  the	  Danish	  population	  proved	  to	  be	  one	  of	  the	  most	   informed	  about	  biotechnology	  in	  the	  1999	  Eurobarometer	  survey,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  came	  out	  as	  one	  of	  the	  most	  sceptical	  (INRA,	  2000;	  Lassen	  et	  al.,	  2006a).	  	  
	  
Potential	  effects	  on	  animal	  welfare	  The	  use	  of	  biotechnology	  on	  animals	  may	  cause	  welfare	  problems,	  and	  the	  present	  section	  provides	  a	  short	   list	   of	   examples.	   GM	   animals	   have	   so	   far	  mainly	   been	   used	  within	   biological	   research	   and	   as	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  disease	   models.	   Usually	   the	   goal	   of	   modification	   is	   to	   produce	   animals	   that	   either	   under-­‐	   or	   over-­‐express	  certain	  genes,	  or	  that	  express	  a	  mutated,	  disease-­‐causing	  human	  gene.	  In	  all	  these	  cases	  body	  function	  in	  the	  organism	  is	  in	  some	  way	  disrupted.	  In	  principle,	  modifications	  can	  involve	  any	  part	  of	  the	  animal	  genome,	  and	  the	  effects	  on	  the	  animal’s	  phenotype	  range	  from	  those	  that	  are	  lethal	  to	  those	  that	  have	  no	  detectable	  effect	  on	  the	  health	  of	  the	  animal.	  It	  is	  therefore	  impossible	  to	  generalise	  about	  the	  welfare	  effects	  of	  genetic	  modification	  (Olsson	  and	  Sandøe,	  2004).	  	  However,	  effects	  may	  be	  divided	  into	  two	  main	  categories:	  the	  intended	  and	  the	  unintended.	  Welfare	  problems	  stemming	  from	  intended	  genetic	  change	  are	  hard	  to	  avoid,	  since	  the	  very	  point	  of	  inducing	  the	  change	  is	  to	  affect	  the	  animal.	  Thus,	  the	  mouse	  carrying	  the	  human	  Huntington’s	  disease	  gene	  will	  inevitably	  suffer	  welfare	  problems	  in	  developing	  the	  disease,	  including	  rapid	  progressive	  loss	  of	  neural	  control	   leading	   to	   premature	   death	   (Naver	   et	   al.,	   2003).	   Unintended	   effects	   are	   connected	  with	   the	  present	   inaccuracy	   of	   the	   technology	   and	  our	   insufficient	   understanding	   of	   the	   function	   of	   different	  genes	  in	  different	  organisms.	  Both	  of	  these	  kinds	  of	  factor	  operate	  to	  create	  the	  rather	  unpredictable	  nature	  of	  genetic	  modification	  at	   the	  phenotypic	   level.	  However,	   it	   is	   likely	   that	  at	   least	   some	  of	   the	  unintended	   welfare	   problems	   can	   be	   avoided	   as	   the	   technology	   and	   our	   scientific	   understanding	  develop.	  Where	  the	  intended	  consequences	  of	  genetic	  modification	  (for	  example,	  in	  creating	  a	  disease	  model)	  are	  concerned,	  it	  may	  be	  possible	  to	  predict	  welfare	  consequences	  using	  information	  about	  the	  effects	   of	   similar	   mutations	   in	   other	   species,	   including	   the	   human	   disease	   symptoms.	   Thus	   some	  studies	  try	  to	  evaluate	  welfare	  consequences	  beforehand.	  This	  potentially	  enables	  the	  producers	  of	  the	  animal	  to	  consider	  these	  consequences	  before	  the	  animal	  is	  actually	  produced	  (Dahl	  et	  al.,	  2003).	  	  Animals	  are	  cloned	  either	  to	  produce	  genetically	  identical	  copies	  of	  desired	  individuals	  or	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  produce	  GM	  animals.	  Owing	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  some	  of	  the	  genetic	  material	  is	  located	  in	  the	  mitochondria	  and	  thus	  is	  provided	  by	  the	  egg	  cell	   that	   is	  used	  in	  cloning,	  and	  to	  certain	  epigenetic	   factors	  that	  are	  not	  yet	  well	  understood,	  the	  cloned	  animal	  will	  not	  be	  100	  %	  identical	  to	  the	  donor	  animal,	  either	  in	  genotype	   or	   phenotype	   (CeBRA,,	   2005c	   and	   2005d).	   The	   importance	   of	   this	   for	   the	   different	  applications	  is	  still	  unclear.	  No	  matter	  what	  the	  purpose,	  the	  success	  rates	  of	  animal	  cloning	  are	   low	  (3-­‐5%),	   and	   of	   the	   few	   individuals	   born,	   many	   suffer	   from	   impaired	   health	   and	   welfare.	   Problems	  include	  placental	  abnormalities,	  foetal	  overgrowth,	  prolonged	  gestation,	  stillbirth,	  hypoxia,	  respiratory	  failure	   and	   circulatory	   problems,	   malformations	   in	   the	   urogenital	   tract,	   malformations	   in	   liver	   and	  brain,	   immune	   dysfunction,	   lymphoid	   hypoplasia,	   anaemia	   and	   bacterial	   and	   viral	   infections	   (van	  Reenen	  et	  al.,	  2001).	  Some	  of	  these	  conditions	  are	  gathered	  under	  the	  term	  Large	  Offspring	  Syndrome	  (LOS).	  LOS	  is	  often	  seen	  in	  cloned	  animals,	  but	  it	  also	  occurs	  when	  other	  reproductive	  technologies	  are	  employed.	   It	   is	   not	   yet	   clear	   whether	   the	   welfare	   problems	   experienced	   by	   cloned	   animals	   can	   be	  avoided	   through	   technological	   or	   methodological	   improvements	   or	   whether	   there	   are	   deeper	  epigenetic	  factors	  behind	  them	  (CeBRA,	  2005c).	  	  	  
Two	  perspectives	  on	  animal	  welfare	  There	  are	  two	  conceptions	  of	  the	  ethical	  concerns	  about	  animal	  welfare	  engendered	  by	  biotechnology:	  a	  narrow	  one	  and	  a	  broader	  one.	  We	  will	  describe	  these	  in	  more	  detail	  below.	  For	  the	  moment	  let	  us	  simply	  note	  that	  the	  first	  focuses	  on	  avoiding	  pain	  and	  other	  kinds	  of	  suffering	  in	  the	  animals,	  and	  on	  promoting	   positive	   experiences:	   in	   general	   this	   conception	   focuses	   on	   the	   subjective	   experiences	   of	  the	   animal.	   Besides	   these	   considerations	   the	   broader	   perspective	   also	   includes	   the	   animal’s	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  opportunity	  to	  engage	  in	  essential	  species-­‐specific	  kinds	  of	  behaviour	  (Fraser	  et	  al.,	  1997;	  Duncan	  and	  Fraser,	  1997;	  Appleby	  and	  Sandøe,	  2002;	  Rollins,	  1993).	  The	  broad	  perspective	  partly	  overlaps	  with	  a	  third	  category	  of	  concern	  in	  which	  animal	  biotechnology	  is	  questioned	  not	  because	  it	  poses	  any	  risks	  to	  animal	  welfare	  but	  because	  it	  is	  seen	  as	  violating	  animal	  integrity	  and	  basic	  concepts	  of	  naturalness.	  There	  is	  thus	  no	  consensus	  as	  to	  what	  should	  be	  counted	  as	  a	  welfare	  problem	  and	  what	  should	  not.	  Here	  we	  will	  simply	  describe	  in	  more	  detail	  some	  of	  the	  welfare	  problems	  that	  animal	  biotechnology	  might	  generate	  from	  the	  two	  main	  perspectives	  within	  the	  debate:	  the	  narrow	  perspective	  that	  looks	  at	  the	  subjective	  experiences	  of	  the	  animal	  and	  the	  broader	  perspective	  that	  also	  looks	  at	  the	  animal’s	  ability	  to	  act	  according	  to	  its	  species-­‐specific	  needs.	  	  From	  a	  narrow	  perspective	  only	  the	  subjective	  experience	  of	  the	  animal	  has	  ethical	  importance.	  If	  the	  animal	   has	   negative	   experiences	   (for	   example,	   pain,	   suffering	   and	   anxiety),	   their	   cause	   (in	   this	   case	  biotechnology)	  is	  deemed	  ethically	  problematic.	  If	  the	  animal	  does	  not	  have	  any	  negative	  experiences,	  as	  for	  instance	  would	  a	  mouse	  with	  cancer	  in	  the	  early	  stages,	   it	  may	  have	  an	  incurable	  illness	  but	  it	  does	  not	  have	  a	  welfare	  problem	  (yet).	  From	   the	   broader	   perspective	   the	   question	   of	   animal	  welfare	   is	   also	   about	   the	   extent	   to	  which	   the	  animal	  is	  allowed	  to	  fulfil	  what	  can	  be	  called	  its	  species-­‐specific	  potential,	  regardless	  of	  its	  subjective	  experience.	  Very	  often	  the	  broader	  perspective	  will	  point	  to	  an	  additional	  group	  of	  considerations	  that	  has	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  when	  we	  reflect	  on	  animal	  welfare.	  Being	  concerned	  with	  the	  opportunity	  of	   the	   animal	   to	   engage	   in	   certain	   kinds	   of	   behaviour	   does	   not	   prevent	   one	   from	   caring	   about	   the	  subjective	  experiences	  of	  the	  animal.	  Nevertheless,	  occasionally	  these	  two	  kinds	  of	  consideration	  are	  difficult	   to	   reconcile	   in	   practice;	   in	   that	   situation	   it	   becomes	   important	   to	   clarify	   what	   kind	   of	  perspective	   is	   in	   play.	   Considerations	   within	   the	   narrow	   perspective	   regarding	   the	   subjective	  experiences	  of	   the	  animal	  might	  be	  outweighed	  by	   the	  other	  considerations	   included	   in	   the	  broader	  perspective	  as	  we	  will	  illustrate	  in	  the	  following.	  	  An	  illustrative	  dilemma	  –	  one	  not	  involving	  biotechnology	  but	  which	  highlights	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  narrow	  and	   the	  broad	  perspective	   –	   concerns	   the	   evaluation	  of	   the	  welfare	   of	   battery	  hens	   and	  free-­‐range	  hens.	   From	  a	  narrow	  perspective,	   there	   is	  no	  ethical	   objection	   to	  denying	   the	  animal	   the	  opportunity	  to	  follow	  its	  instincts	  (as	  battery	  cage	  egg	  production	  does)	  as	  long	  as	  this	  does	  not	  affect	  the	  subjective	  welfare	  of	  the	  animal,	  that	  is,	  lead	  to	  negative	  experiences	  (Appleby	  and	  Sandøe,	  2002).	  One	  can	  rarely	  prevent	  an	  animal	  from	  following	  its	  instincts	  without	  causing	  it	  suffering,	  but	  through	  breeding	   (either	   of	   the	   conventional	   sort	   or	   involving	   cloning	   and/or	   genetic	   engineering)	   changes	  could	  theoretically	  be	  induced	  in	  the	  animal	  that	  will	  make	  it	  more	  fit	  for	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  it	  will	   have	   to	   live.	   And	   since	   this	  would	   have	   no	   negative	   subjective	   consequences	   for	   the	   individual	  hens,	   such	   a	   use	   of	   biotechnology	   would	   be	   seen	   as	   ethically	   unproblematic.	   This	   means	   that	   for	  instance	   the	  welfare	   problems	   caused	   by	   battery	   cage	   egg	   production	   could	   theoretically	   be	   solved	  through	  breeding	   chickens	   that	   did	   not	   suffer	   because	   of	   these	   conditions	   rather	   than	   changing	   the	  conditions	  (Rollin,	  1995).	  In	  practice	  though,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  see	  how	  this	  can	  become	  a	  reality	  in	  the	  foreseeable	  future.	  Firstly,	  the	  trait	  to	  breed	  for	  would	  have	  a	  complex	  genetic	  background,	  since	  the	  objective	  must	  be	  an	  animal	  in	  which	  one	  has	  eradicated	  all	  motivations	  other	  than	  those	  that	  can	  be	  satisfied	  in	  a	  battery	  cage.	  Secondly,	  it	  will	  be	  a	  difficult	  challenge	  to	  ensure	  that	  one	  is	  indeed	  breeding	  for	  an	  animal	  with	  a	  restricted	  set	  of	  motivations	  rather	  than	  an	  animal	  that	  reacts	  passively,	  or	  even	  with	  apathy,	   to	   adverse	   conditions.	  This	   is	  not	   to	   say	   that	  breeding	   for	  behavioural	   traits	   cannot	  be	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  used	   to	   improve	   animal	  welfare	   (problem	   behaviours	   such	   as	   feather	   pecking	   in	   hens	   have	   indeed	  been	  shown	  to	  be	  under	  genetic	  control),	  only	  that	  the	  objective	  of	  producing	  what	  Ben	  Mepham	  calls	  an	  “animal	  vegetable”	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  easily	  obtainable.	  From	   the	   broader	   perspective	   the	   very	   idea	   that	  we	   should	   breed	   hens	   to	   cope	  with	   battery	   cages	  raises	  serious	  worries	  and	  questions	  about	  what	  the	  natural	  life	  of	  a	  chicken	  is,	  and	  what	  experiences	  constitute	  such	  a	  life.	  Instead	  of	  changing	  the	  chicken,	  one	  would	  look	  for	  ways	  of	  allowing	  the	  chicken	  to	  fulfil	  its	  natural	  potential	  as	  far	  as	  possible	  through	  changes	  in	  the	  production	  system.	  Life	  as	  a	  free-­‐range	   chicken	   is	   obviously	   less	   protected	   than	   life	   as	   a	   battery	   hen.	   Disease,	   feather	   pecking	   and	  cannibalism	  occur	  frequently	  within	  flocks	  of	  chickens	  (Kjær	  and	  Sørensen,	  2002).	  Nevertheless,	  from	  a	  broader	  perspective	  this	  may	  be	  an	  acceptable	  situation,	  since	  it	  is	  counterbalanced	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  chickens	  are	  living	  more	  naturally.	  From	  a	  broad	  perspective	  the	  new	  animal	  biotechnologies	  raise	  concerns	  in	  two	  areas.	  First	  of	  all,	  they	  extend	   technological	   control	   over	   procreation	   –	   a	   control	   that	   is	   already	  widespread	  within	   animal	  breeding	  through	  the	  use	  of	  semen	  collection,	  artificial	  insemination,	  superovulation,	  embryo	  transfer,	  transvaginal	  ovum	  pick	  up,	  etc.	  This	  affects	  both	   the	  process	   (the	  sexual	   life	  of	   the	  animals)	  and	   the	  result	   (the	   offspring).	   In	   both	   cases	   it	   can	   be	   questioned	   whether	   this	   interference	   is	   ethically	  acceptable,	  since	  all	  the	  technologies	  mentioned	  can,	  in	  very	  general	  terms,	  be	  described	  as	  unnatural	  when	   compared	   to	   the	   “normal”	   life	   of	   animals.	   Secondly	   however,	   the	   idea	   of	   naturalness	   as	  something	   valuable	   in	   itself	   raises	   questions	   about	   how	   naturalness	   should	   be	   understood.	   From	  animals	  used	   in	  basic	   research	   to	   farm	  animals	  bred	   for	  production,	  one	  can	  question	   if	   anything	   in	  their	  life	  is	  natural	  –	  at	  any	  rate,	  if	  “natural”	  means	  wild.	  The	  question	  should	  perhaps	  rather	  be	  about	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  domesticated	  animal	  has	  an	  opportunity	  to	  fulfil	  its	  species-­‐specific	  behaviour	  within	  the	  framework	  that	  the	  domestication	  process	  has	  built.	  Thus	  a	   laboratory	  mouse	  will	   live	   its	  life	  in	  a	  cage,	  but	  it	  might	  nonetheless	  fulfil	  certain	  species-­‐specific	  behaviour	  (for	  example,	  digging	  or	  nest	  building)	  if	  given	  the	  chance.	  Another	  case	  illustrating	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  narrow	  and	  the	  broad	  perspective	  is	  that	  of	  blind	  hens.	  Since	  genetically	  modified	  and/or	  cloned	  animals	  have	  not	  been	  introduced	  into	  the	  agricultural	  production	  system	  yet,	  we	  cannot	  draw	  on	  concrete	  examples	  but	  will	  highlight	  the	  envisioned	  ethical	  considerations	   by	   using	   realistic	   analogical	   examples.	   A	   Canadian	   scientist	   involved	   in	   poultry	  breeding	  has	  bred	  a	  blind	  egg-­‐laying	  hen	  (Ali	  and	  Cheng,	  1985).	  This	  variety	  of	  hen,	  according	  to	  the	  researcher,	  would	  help	  to	  reduce	  the	  welfare	  problems	  of	  free-­‐range	  chickens.	  These	  birds	  harm	  one	  another	   by	   pecking,	   and	   sometimes	   even	   cannibalising,	   weaker	   members	   of	   the	   flock.	   Blindness	  apparently	  reduced	  these	  kinds	  of	  behaviour.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  blindness	  was	  not	  inflicted	  on	  living	  chickens,	  but	  something	  they	  were	  born	  with.	  From	  a	  narrow	  welfare	  perspective	  the	  blind	  hens	  seem	  to	  be	  better	  off	  than	  their	  sighted	  peers.	  	  At	  this	  point	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  distinguish	  between	  two	  different	  viewpoints	  within	  the	  broad	  animal	  welfare	   perspective.	   To	   people	   taking	   the	   first	   viewpoint,	   both	   the	   notion	   of	   deliberately	   breeding	  chickens	  that	  have	  such	  limited	  potential	  as	  to	  be	  content	  with	  life	  as	  a	  battery	  cage	  hen	  and	  the	  aim	  of	  breeding	   blind	   hens	   to	   solve	   production	   problems	   in	   the	   agricultural	   sector	   are	   seen	   as	   ethically	  problematic	  in	  ways	  that	  might	  outweigh	  the	  advantages	  of	  these	  ideas	  as	  perceived	  from	  the	  narrow	  perspective.	   Something	   just	   seems	   to	   be	   amiss	   when	   you	   deliberately	   create	   an	   animal	   with	   less	  potential	  than	  normal	  (Lassen	  et	  al.,	  2006a),	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  animal	  has	  negative	  experiences	  as	  a	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  result.	  Implicit	  in	  this	  version	  of	  the	  broader	  perspective	  is	  a	  certain	  respect	  for	  the	  natural	  state	  of	  the	  animal.	  Although	  it	  is	  intuitively	  compelling,	  it	  should	  be	  pointed	  out	  that	  this	  perspective	  suffers	  from	  an	  inherent	  ambiguity	  when	  domesticated	  animals	  are	  discussed,	  since	  it	  is	  almost	  impossible	  to	  point	  to	  a	  stage	  in	  the	  development	  of	  such	  animals	  that	  would	  constitute	  their	  natural	  state	  and	  thus	  be	  the	  developmental	  point	  that	  should	  be	  respected	  (Appleby	  and	  Sandøe,	  2002).	  This	   is	   a	   leading	   reason	   why	   other	   thinkers	   have	   suggested	   a	   different	   way	   of	   considering	   animal	  welfare	   problems	   within	   the	   broader	   perspective.	   They	   believe	   that	   the	   natural	   behaviour	   of	   the	  animal	  is	  to	  be	  respected,	  but	  the	  natural	  behaviour	  of	  the	  animal	  is	  not	  seen	  as	  something	  static.	  And	  just	   as	  domesticated	  animals	  have	  been	  bred	   to	  be	  better	   adapted	   to	  housing	   in	   confinement	   in	   the	  past,	   animals	   today	   can	  be	  bred,	   either	   conventionally	   or	   through	   genetic	  modification,	   to	   be	  better	  adapted	  for	  modern	  day	  production	  systems.	  Thus	  the	  fact	  that	  one	  can	  alter	  the	  nature	  of	  an	  animal	  by	  genetic	  modification	  does	  not	  constitute	  an	  ethical	  problem	  as	  long	  as	  one	  respects	  the	  nature	  that	  the	  animal	  ends	  up	  with	  (Rollin,	  1995).	  	  Whether	   we	   choose	   to	   look	   at	   animal	   welfare	   from	   a	   narrow	   perspective	   or	   one	   of	   the	   broader	  perspectives,	   two	   additional	   important	   issues	   must	   be	   borne	   in	   mind	   when	   evaluating	   the	   ethical	  dimensions	  of	  animal	  biotechnology.	  First	  of	  all,	   it	   is	   important	   to	  note	   that,	   from	  an	  animal	  welfare	  perspective,	   the	   difference	   between	   traditional	   breeding	   technologies	   and	   the	   new	   biotechnological	  tools	  seems	  to	  be	  more	  of	  a	  quantitative	  difference	   in	  the	  potential	  of	  applications	  than	  a	  qualitative	  difference	  that	  creates	  entirely	  new	  welfare	  issues.	  	  The	   second	   issue	   is	   that	   the	   range	   of	   ethical	   concerns	   raised	   by	   animal	   biotechnology	   goes	   beyond	  questions	   of	   risks	   to	   animal	  welfare.	   An	   obvious	   group	   of	   considerations	   that	  we	   have	   only	   briefly	  mentioned	   concerns	   risks	   to	   human	   health.	   These	   considerations	   are	   usually	   treated	   within	   risk	  assessment	  frameworks.	  Then	  there	  is	  the	  familiar	  concern	  that	  one	  or	  other	  proposed	  uses	  of	  animal	  biotechnology	  might	   be	   the	   beginning	   of	   a	   “slippery	   slope”	   culminating	   in	   genetic	  modification	   and	  cloning	  of	   humans.	  The	  broadly	   social	   impact	   of	   animal	  biotechnology	  on	   agricultural	   structure,	   the	  economy	   and	   so	   on,	   is	   also	   an	   important	   ethical	   aspect	   to	   be	   considered	   in	   relation	   to	   animal	  biotechnology,	   as	   is	   the	   possible	   change	   that	   greater	   control	   of	   nature	   as	   such	   could	   induce	   in	   the	  overall	  relationship	  between	  humans	  and	  nature.	  We	  mention	  this	  only	  to	  emphasise	  that	  issues	  other	  than	   animal	   welfare	   –	   and	   issues	   of	   an	   equally	   complex	   kind	   –	   arise	   in	   connection	   with	   animal	  biotechnology.	  These	  are	  not	  covered	  in	  this	  article.	  
	  
The	  challenges	  of	  animal	  biotechnology	  	  Questions	  about	  the	  real	  difference	  between	  genetic	  engineering	  and	  animal	  cloning,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  more	  conventional	  ways	  of	  “improving”	  animals	  by	  selective	  breeding	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  disease	  models	   through,	   for	   example,	   exposure	   to	   chemical	   compounds	   or	   radiation,	   on	   the	   other,	   are	  important	   –	   not	   least	   because	   the	   interconnectedness	   of	   the	   new	   technologies	  with	   the	   old	   is	   often	  used	   as	   an	   argument	   for	   the	   new	   biotechnologies.	   The	   argument	   runs	   roughly	   as	   follows.	   There	   is	  nothing	  new	  under	  the	  sun.	  We	  continue	  to	  change	  animals	  to	  suit	  our	  own	  needs.	  Only	  the	  precision	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  methods	  has	  changed	  (Kues	  and	  Niemann,	  2004).	  Hence	  animal	  biotechnology	  raises	  no	  unique	  ethical	  problems.	  As	  we	  have	  shown	  above,	  and	  as	  it	  has	  been	  argued	  in	  a	  number	  of	  publications	  in	  recent	  years	  (for	  example,	  Olsson	  and	  Sandøe,	  2004;	  Buehr	  et	  al.,	  2004;	  NAS,	  2002),	  the	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  premises	  of	   this	   argument	  do	   seem	   to	  be	   true.	  At	   least,	   it	   is	   true	   that	  most	  of	   the	  welfare	  problems	  associated	  with	  cloning	  and	  genetic	  engineering	  can	  be	  found	  in	  more	  conventional	  technologies	  too.	  Large	  Offspring	  Syndrome	   is	  not	  only	  a	  problem	  within	   the	  cloning	   technology,	  but	  also	  when	  other	  kinds	   of	   biotechnology	   procedures	   are	   used	   (CeBRA,	   2005c).	   The	   welfare	   problems	   that	  may	   arise	  from	  depriving	  animals	  of	  their	  natural	  procreative	  activity	  are	  also	  linked	  to	  other	  technologies.	  And	  welfare	  problems	  arising	  from	  the	  genetic	  engineering	  of	  animals	  can	  be	  found	  in	  selective	  breeding	  programmes	   as	  well,	   as	   for	   instance	  when	   an	   excessively	   narrow	   focus	   on	   productivity	   leads	   to	   leg	  disorders	   in	   broiler	   chickens,	   or	   to	   increased	   levels	   of	  mastitis	   in	   cows	   (Olsson	   and	   Sandøe,	   2004).	  Ironically	  enough,	  the	  most	  eye-­‐catching	  difference	  between	  the	  old	  and	  the	  new	  technologies	  may	  be	  uncertainty	   about	   the	   unintended	   side	   effects	   in	   the	   latter,	   and	   especially	  with	   genetic	   engineering,	  since	  this	  contradicts	  the	  biotechnologist’s	  claim	  to	  work	  with	  greater	  precision.	  However,	   it	   is	   not	   possible	   to	   dismiss	   criticism	   of	   animal	   biotechnology	   merely	   by	   pointing	   to	   the	  similarities	   between	   earlier	   and	  new	  uses	   of	   animal	   technology.	  The	  problem	  with	   this	   argument	   is	  that	  people	  will	  not	  necessarily	  have	  accepted	  the	  older	  techniques.	  Members	  of	  the	  public	  are	  largely	  unaware	   of	   the	   consequences	   of	   selective	   breeding.	   In	   general	   they	   are	   critical	   of	   confined	   housing	  systems,	   but	   in	   reality	   they	  were	   consulted	  on	  neither	  of	   these	  matters.	  We	  would	   therefore	   like	   to	  reverse	   the	   argument:	   public	  worries	   about	   new	   biotechnologies,	   and	   the	   genuine	   ethical	   concerns	  into	   which	   they	   can	   be	   translated,	   should	   be	   seen	   as	   a	   reason	   to	   critically	   analyse	   not	   only	   new	  biotechnologies	  but	  also	  existing	  technologies,	  and	  as	  a	  trigger	   for	  serious	  discussion	  of	   the	   limits	  to	  what	  it	  is	  ethically	  acceptable	  to	  do	  to	  animals	  (Olsson	  and	  Sandøe,	  2005).	  Animal	  biotechnology	  might	  not	  be	  something	  radically	  new,	  but	  it	  can	  be	  the	  straw	  that	  broke	  the	  camel’s	  back	  (Cooper,	  1998).	  What	  is	  evident	  today	  is	  that	  ethical	  questions	  raised	  about	  the	  regulation	  of	  the	  new	  biotechnologies	  used	  on	  animals	  are	  not	  concerned	  only	  with	  the	  question	  of	  welfare	  understood	  as	  mental	  states	  or	  experience.	  Today,	  all	  parties	  in	  the	  debate	  agree	  that	  there	  are	  limits	  to	  the	  amount	  of	  physical	  pain	  or	  mental	  stress	  that	   it	   is	  ethically	   justifiable	  to	   impose	  on	  an	  animal.	  But	   it	   is	  also	  becoming	  more	  and	  more	  widely	   recognised	   that	  other	   factors	   should	   influence	   the	  way	  we	   treat	   animals.	  These	   factors	  include	  the	  preservation	  of	  the	  naturalness	  of	  the	  animal,	  and	  the	  importance	  of	  giving	  an	  animal	  the	  opportunity	   to	   fulfil	   its	   species-­‐specific	  potential.	   Such	   factors	   are	  becoming	   increasingly	  prominent	  within	  the	  regulatory	  debate.	  Of	  course,	   they	  are	  especially	  conspicuous	  when	  no	  traditional	  welfare	  problems	  are	  at	  stake.	  As	  we	  have	  argued,	  there	  are	  two	  different	  conceptions	  of	  animal	  welfare	  in	  the	  ethical	  debate	  about	  animal	  biotechnology:	  one	  that	  focuses	  on	  the	  mental	  states	  of	  the	  animals	  and	  one	  that	  takes	  broader	  considerations	   into	   view.	   It	   is	   very	   seldom	   that	   one	   encounters	   the	   view	   that	   animal	   welfare	   is	  irrelevant	   to	   the	   evaluation	   of	   the	   biotechnological	   possibilities.	   This	   situation,	   though,	   should	   be	  compared	  with	  the	  situation	  only	  15	  to	  20	  years	  ago.	  At	   that	   time,	  only	  a	  minority	  defended	  what	   is	  today	  considered	  the	  narrow	  perspective	  (Matheny,	  2005).	  This	  shift	  in	  attitudes	  can	  also	  be	  detected	  in	   the	   regulatory	   framework.	   Consider	   Article	   3	   of	   the	   Protocol	   of	   Amendment	   to	   the	   European	  Convention	  for	  the	  Protection	  of	  Animals	  kept	  for	  Farming	  Purposes	  adopted	  by	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe	  in	  1992:	  
Natural	  or	  artificial	  breeding	  or	  breeding	  procedures	  which	  cause	  or	  are	  likely	  to	  cause	  suffering	  or	  injury	  to	  
any	  of	  the	  animals	  involved	  shall	  not	  be	  practised;	  no	  animal	  shall	  be	  kept	  for	  farming	  purposes	  unless	  it	  can	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be	  reasonably	  expected,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  its	  phenotype	  or	  genotype,	  that	  it	  can	  be	  kept	  without	  detrimental	  
effects	  on	  its	  health	  or	  welfare.2	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  even	  though	  this	  article	  of	  the	  amending	  protocol	  focuses	  “only”	  on	  the	  narrow	  conception	   of	   animal	   welfare,	   it	   has	   proved	   difficult	   to	   transpose	   the	   convention	   into	   European	  legislation.	   At	   any	   rate,	   this	   excerpt	   can	   be	   compared	   with	   recently	   passed	   legislation	   on	   cloned	  animals	   in	   Denmark.	   In	   this	   legislation	   it	   is	   explicitly	   stated	   that	   animals	  may	   be	   cloned	   only	   if	   an	  independent	   research	   approval	   committee	   deems	   the	   purpose	   of	   this	   procedure	   useful	   (Danish	  Ministry	  of	  Justice,	  2005).	  What	  is	  most	  noteworthy	  here	  is	  that	  the	  law	  limits	  certain	  applications	  of	  animal	  cloning	  regardless	  of	  its	  effect	  on	  animal	  welfare.	  This	  means	  that	  even	  if	  no	  welfare	  problems	  are	   involved,	   it	   is	   still	  necessary	   to	  demonstrate	   the	  perceived	  usefulness	  of	   the	   technology	   to	  show	  that	   it	   is	   ethically	   acceptable.	   This	   justification	   involves	   balancing	   the	   perceived	   goal	   of	   the	   process	  (research,	   medicine,	   agriculture,	   etc.)	   and	   the	   ethically	   problematic	   features	   inherent	   in	   the	  technology.	   The	   underlying	   motive	   for	   this	   strict	   regulation	   of	   animal	   cloning	   is	   not	   stated	   in	   the	  Danish	  legislation,	  but	  it	  is	  evident	  from	  the	  report	  prepared	  as	  foundation	  for	  the	  legislative	  work	  that	  the	   concept	  of	   animal	   integrity	   is	   one	  of	   the	  major	   factors	   (Danish	  Ministry	   for	   Science,	  Technology	  and	  Development,	  2003).	  In	  December	  2002	  the	  Folketinget	  [Danish	  parliament]	  decided	  to	  encourage	  the	   government	   to	   appoint	   a	   preparatory	   committee	   to	   follow	   up	   the	   Folketinget	   motion	   for	  adjournment	  of	  May	  1997	  with	  a	  view	  to	  establishing	  rules	  for	  research	  regarding	  animal	  cloning	  and	  accompanying	   technologies.	  The	   result	   of	   this	  work	   can	  be	   seen	   in	  The	  Danish	  Ministry	   for	   Science,	  Technology	  and	  Development	  2003.	  	  Animal	   integrity	   can	   perhaps	   best	   be	   understood	   as	   an	   inherent	   limit	   in	   the	   relationship	   between	  humans	   and	   nature	   governing	   what	   is	   ethically	   acceptable	   for	   humans	   to	   do	   to	   animals.	   In	   other	  words,	   integrity	  is	  a	   limit	  based	  on	  an	  understanding	  or	  experience	  of	  animals	  as	  beings	  surrounded	  by	   an	   impenetrable	   aura	   that	   may	   be	   violated	   only	   if	   the	   reasons	   are	   adequate	   from	   an	   ethical	  perspective	   (Gjerris,	   2005).	   It	   should	   be	   noted	   here	   that	   this	   is	   only	   a	   rough	   outline	   for	   one	  interpretation	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   integrity.	   Nevertheless,	   it	   should	   be	   clear	   that	   the	   idea	   of	   animal	  integrity	  both	  broadens	  the	  concept	  of	  animal	  welfare	  beyond	  the	  narrow	  perspective	  and	  rejects	  the	  notion	  that	  the	  naturalness	  of	  an	  animal	  is	  something	  that	  should	  only	  be	  respected	  in	  the	  individual	  animal	  –	   thus	  permitting	  humans	   to	   change	   the	  nature	  of	   animals	   in	  general,	   as	  was	   the	  case	   in	   the	  second	  version	  of	  the	  broader	  perspective.	  The	  balancing	  of	  commercial	  and	  scientific	  interests	  against	  the	  “interests”	  of	  the	  animals	  raises	  a	  set	  of	  challenges.	  These	  challenges	  arise	  both	  for	  proponents	  of	  the	  broader	  approach	  (who	  will	  have	  to	  argue	   convincingly	   that	   a	   concept	   such	   as	   integrity	   should	   be	   respected)	   and	   in	   the	   political	   and	  regulatory	  process	  that	  follows	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  different	  applications	  of	  biotechnology	  on	  animals.	  What	   is	  clear	   from	  a	  number	  of	  European	  surveys	   is	   that	  concepts	  such	  as	   integrity	  and	  naturalness	  play	   a	   significant	   and	   growing	   role	   in	   the	   general	   perception	   of	   legitimate	   use	   of	   biotechnology	   on	  animals	  (Lassen	  et	  al.,	  2005a).	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  This	  situation	  could	  lead	  to	  a	  growing	  discrepancy	  between	  the	  very	  scientific	  and	  individualistic	  way	  of	  evaluating	  the	  ethical	  consequences	  of	  animal	  biotechnology	  that	  is	  implicit	  in	  risk-­‐based	  studies	  of	  human	  health	  and	  animal	  welfare	  which	  have	  traditionally	  guided	  the	  regulatory	  process	  and	  a	  wider	  evaluation,	  involving	  notions	  of	  naturalness	  and	  integrity,	  for	  example.	  We	  do	  not	  mean	  to	  imply	  that	  there	   is	   something	  wrong	  with	   the	   scientific	   approach,	   but	  we	  do	  wish	   to	   point	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  ethical	   concerns	  go	  deeper	   than	   that.	  As	   suggested,	  more	  general	  questions	  about	   the	  way	   in	  which	  animal	  biotechnology	  may	  contribute	  to	  change	  in	  the	  social	  world,	  about	  the	  possibility	  that	  animal	  cloning	   may	   facilitate	   reproductive	   cloning	   of	   humans,	   and	   about	   the	   perceived	   naturalness	   of	   the	  animals,	   are	   omitted	   in	   the	   scientific	   approach.	   This	   difference	   may	   also	   have	   a	   geographical	   and	  geopolitical	   dimension:	   where	   Europe	   and	   the	   EU	   are	  moving	   towards	   a	   broader	   understanding	   of	  animal	   welfare	   as	   the	   basis	   for	   regulation,	   the	   United	   States	   maintain	   a	   narrow	   understanding	   of	  animal	  welfare	  when	   they	  evaluate	  new	  biotechnology.	  This	   is	  evident	   in	   the	  emerging	   transatlantic	  discussion	   of	   the	   regulation	   of	   cloned	   animals	   and	   products	   derived	   from	   them	   or	   their	   offspring	  (CeBRA,	  2005b).	  	  Closer	  examination	  of	  what	  assumptions	  underlie	  the	  call	  for	  protection	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  animals	  could	  be	   a	   way	   of	   addressing	   some	   of	   these	   questions.	   These	   questions	   are	   usually	   dealt	   with	   rather	  superficially	   in	   the	  scientific	   literature,	  but	   they	  nonetheless	  play	  a	  significant	  role	   in	   forming	  public	  attitudes	   towards	   animal	   biotechnology	   (Lassen	   et	   al.,	   2006a,	   b).	   The	   fact	   that	   concepts	   such	   as	  naturalness	   or	   integrity	   are	   complex	   and	   not	   readily	   quantified	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   they	   are	  inappropriate	   subjects	   for	   rational	  discussion.	   It	   just	  means	   that	   they	  have	   to	  be	  discussed	  within	  a	  broader	  context	  than	  a	  narrow	  scientific	  one.	  Any	  such	  discussion	  will	  reveal	  that	  there	  is	  more	  than	  one	  way	  to	  interpret	  such	  concepts.	  One	  way	  would	   be	   to	   claim	   that	   a	   concept	   such	   as	   naturalness	   tries	   to	   capture	   the	   distinction	   between	   the	  knowledge	  of	  the	  animal	  that	  is	  expressed	  through	  our	  understanding	  of	  its	  usefulness	  to	  humans	  and	  the	  knowledge	   that	   is	   expressed	   in	  our	   immediate	  experience	  of	   the	  animal.	  A	   cow	   is	   a	  producer	  of	  hide,	  milk	   and	  meat;	   it	   holds	   no	   surprises	  when	   experienced	   from	   a	   human	   perspective,	  where	   the	  fulfilment	  of	  human	  need	  is	  at	  the	  centre.	  But	  in	  another	  perspective,	  where	  the	  cow	  is	  understood	  as	  something	   independent	   of	   humans	   –	   as	   a	   life	   form	  with	   its	   own	  needs,	   history	   and	   importance	   –	   it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  we	  do	  not	  know	  all	  there	  is	  to	  know	  about	  cows	  just	  because	  we	  know	  how	  to	  use	  them.	  There	   is	   something	  more	   to	   cows:	   something	   that	   in	   a	   sense	  alienates	   them	   from	  us	  and	   that	  should	  prevent	  us	  from	  reducing	  them	  to	  merely	  a	  means	  to	  our	  ends.	  Implicit	   in	   this	  distinction	   is	  a	  notion	  of	   the	  amount	  of	   control	  over	   the	  animal	   that	  we	  can	  exercise	  without	  violating	  its	  naturalness	  or	  integrity.	  In	  this	  sense,	  respect	  for	  naturalness	  can	  be	  understood	  as	   the	   polar	   opposite	   of	   total	   commodification	   of	   the	   animal	   as	   a	   natural	   resource.	   Although	   these	  notions	   are	   hardly	   of	   a	   scientific	   nature,	   they	   can	   be	   discussed	   meaningfully.	   They	   should	   not	  necessarily	  be	  dismissed	  offhand	  as	  either	  irrational	  or	  built	  upon	  elaborate	  religious	  or	  philosophical	  systems.	  They	  could	  also	  offer	  ways	  of	  describing	  very	  basic	  experiences	  of	  animals	  as	  something	  more	  than	  biological	  machines	  (Gjerris,	  2005).	  Whether	  considerations	  such	  as	  these	  should	  play	  a	  role	  in	  future	  regulation	  of	  animal	  biotechnology	  and	  more	  conventional	  ways	  of	  breeding	  animals	  is	  an	  open	  question.	  There	  can	  be	  no	  doubt,	  however,	  that	   failure	   to	   take	   them	   seriously	   will	   deepen	   the	   already	   existing	   gap	   concerning	   the	   ethical	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  legitimacy	  of	  biotechnology,	  between	  science	  and	  industry,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  the	  general	  public,	  on	  the	  other.	  We	  should	  seek	  socially	  robust	  solutions	  to	  the	  challenges	  that	  animal	  biotechnology	  raises.	  This	  may	  mean	  that	  we	  have	  to	  develop	  regulation	  that	  is	  based	  on	  something	  broader	  than	  empirical	  knowledge	   about	   physical	   risks	   to	   humans	   and	   animals.	   It	   may	   also	   mean	   not	   only	   that	   new	  possibilities	  will	  be	  rejected	  but	  also	  that	  existing	  practices	  within,	  say,	  animal	  breeding	  will	  need	  to	  be	  re-­‐evaluated.	   But	   since	   the	   alternative	   scenario	   might	   very	   well	   be	   one	   in	   which	   growing	   public	  acceptance	  of	  the	  broader	  approach	  leads	  to	  even	  more	  negative	  public	  attitudes	  to	  new	  applications	  of	   animal	   biotechnology	   and	   conventional	   animal	   husbandry,	   this	  may	   be	   in	   the	   interests	   of	   all	   the	  stakeholders	  in	  the	  debate.	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